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The Persian Gulf War Oil Spill: Reassessing the Law of
Environmental Protection and the Law of Armed Conflict
Christopher C. Joyner* and James T. Kirkhope**

I.

INTRODUCTION

recent years there has developed within the law of nations a special
i ncorpus
of legal norms aimed at protecting the earth's environment.
The philosophy undergirding this international environmental law seeks
to promote a protection ethic to confront situations that put the integrity
of the environment at risk. International environmental law has thus
become primarily preclusive in nature. It aims to establish norms that
prevent and dissuade harmful injury to the environment, rather than
those that might restore or react to injuries already done.1
Perhaps the most destructive among man's many activities that
threaten the environment is that of war. Indeed, it remains axiomatic
that warfare is detrimental to the environment. 2 The international community has responded to this challenge by establishing special responsibilities and obligations for governments within the existing international
law of armed conflict. The modern law of armed conflict sets forth
norms and expectations expressly designed to restrict the ways and
means of destruction during war by mandating that belligerents consider
what environmental impacts their actions will have.' The regulatory
crossroads between the law of environmental protection and the law of
armed conflict became joined during the 1991 Persian Gulf War waged
by the United Nations allied coalition against Iraq.
On January 16, 1991, U.N. coalition air forces attacked Iraqi mili* Professor of Political Science and Member of the Elliott School of International Affairs, The

George Washington University.
** Research Coordinator, Terrorism and Law-Intensity Conflict Program, U.S. Global Strategy Council.
I See generally Oscar Schachter, The Emergence of InternationalEnvironmental Law, 44 J.
INT'L AFr. 457 (1991).
2 See generally STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTrrrTE (SIPRI), EcoLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR (1976); SIPRI, ENVIRONMENTAL
WARFARE: A TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY APPRAISAL (Arthur H. Westing ed. 1984); SIPRI,
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1977).
3 See generally FRiTs KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR (1987).
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tary targets in Kuwait and Iraq. The attack came more than six months
after Iraq's conquest and occupation of Kuwait and Suddam Hussein's
persistent refusal to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait after repeated international efforts to negotiate a peaceful end to the situation.5 On January 26, press reports indicated that Iraq had taken retaliatory action by
deliberately pumping huge amounts of crude oil from Kuwait's Sea Island Oil Terminal into the Persian Gulf, beginning perhaps as early as
January 23.6 The oil that gushed forth from the supertanker facility
eventually produced a forty mile oil slick along the southern Kuwaiti and
northern Saudi coastline.7 Initial estimates placed the total volume of
petroleum discharged between fifteen and seventeen million gallons,
amounting to the largest spill ever in the Persian Gulf.' Later estimates
confirmed and even elevated the magnitude of the disaster. By late January, the volume of oil contaminating the Gulf had reached some 460
million gallons, the largest oil spill in history.9 Experts predicted the
disaster would be twelve times greater than the Exxon Valdez oil spill
that had occurred in March 1989 off Prince William Sound, Alaska.' °
Suspicion about Iraq's motivations for its deliberate release of oil
into the Persian Gulf centered on the slick's potential impact of hindering an amphibious assault by allied forces along the Kuwaiti coast.'I
Another motivation may have been the incapacitating effects such oil
contamination could wreak on Saudi Arabia's desalinization plants, a circumstance that would have severely deprived allied forces of necessary
water supplies.' 2 In the end, however, the slick produced neither of
those results. What it did produce was unprecedented environmental
4 Andrew Rosenthal, US. and Allies Open Air War on Iraq; Bomb Baghdad and Kuwaiti
Targets; "No Choice" But Force, Bush Declares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1991, at Al.
5 See generally Christopher C. Joyner, Sanctions, Compliance and InternationalLaw: Reflections on the United Nations' Experience Against Iraq, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1991).
6 See R.W. Apple, Jr., US. Says Iraq Pumps Kuwaiti Oil into Guy,' Vast Damage is Feared
from GrowingSlick, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1991, at Al; Robert D. McFadden, Oil ThreatensFishing
and Water Supply, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1991, at Al. Oil was reported to be spewing from the Sea
Island Terminal off the coast of Kuwait, approximately one-half of which was coming from storage
facilities, with the remainder being pumped through undersea pipes from 5 tankers berthed at the
occupied Kuwaiti port of Mina al Ahmadi. Rick Atkinson & Dan Balz, IraqDumping Flood of Oil
Into Gulf US. Says, WASH. PosT, Jan. 26, 1991, at Al.
7 R.W. Apple Jr., OilSpill, GrowingRapidly, Headsfor Vital SaudiSites; Air War Goals Said to
Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1991, at Al.
8 Keith Schneider, Saudis Seek U.S. Help with Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1991, at A12.
9 R.W. Apple, Jr., War in the Gulf. The Overview; 80 of Iraq'sPlanesNow in Iran;Hosts Intent
Called a Puzzle; U.S. Says Flow of Oil is Stemmed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1991, at Al.
10 The Exxon Valdez lost 11 million gallons of crude oil when it went aground on March 24,
1989. See Worst U.S. Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1991, at A4.
II Apple, supra note 7. See also Philip Shenon, Huge Slick Still a Threat to Saudi Water
Plants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1991, at Al.
12 Apple, supra note 7. The spill threatened to close Saudi Arabia's largest desalting plant at
Jubail, which produces one-half the potable water for Saudi Arabia. See Schneider, supra note 8;
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devastation throughout the Persian Gulf. The shrimp industry in the
Gulf was practically wiped out, fish and other marine life were ravaged,
and the Gulf's rich coral reef was put on the brink of extinction.' 3
Highlighted by recent concern over grave global implications of con-

temporary environmental abuse, Iraq's resort to oil pollution as a
weapon of environmental destruction raises important legal questions
that need to be addressed. Accordingly, this study focuses on the international legal ramifications of a government's intentional discharge of
petroleum into a local marine environment during wartime.1 4 Both environmental protection law and the law of armed conflict are examined,
with a special view toward assessing their regulatory interface. The
problems of determining lawful intent and policy rationale are then
treated. From this analysis, it is hoped that a greater appreciation will
emerge of the positive dynamics between environmental law and the laws

of war, not only for the case of Iraq during the 1991 Persian Gulf War,
but also for the regulation of armed conflict in general.
II.

SETTING THE GULF STAGE

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and conquered its neighbor, KuR.W. Apple, Jr., Relentless Tide of Oil FoulsShores ofEmpty SaudiCity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1991,
at Al.
13 Philip Shenon, Oil Company Ecologist Fears Slick Will Leave a "DeadGulf," N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 1991, at A7. Sea turtles, shrimp, dolphins, and marine birds were feared grievously affected.
Id. See also Michael Isikoff, Saudis Bracefor Onslaughtof Oil Slick, WASH. POsT., Jan. 27, 1991, at
A22; Barbara Rosewicz, Upping the Ante: Gulf Oil Spill Shows Iraq's Resolve to Wage War on Its
Own Terms, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1991, at Al & A4. For an insider's perspective of the cleanup
operation organized by Saudi Aramco and its Oil Spill Committee, see Tom Pledge, War Within a
War: Fighting the Gulf Oil Spill, ARAMCO WORLD, May-June 1991, at 35. For treatment of the
impacts of ocean pollution, see generally K. A. GouRLAY, PoisoNERs OF THE SEAS (1988).
14 It should not be overlooked that Iraqi forces also torched 752 oil wells as they were fleeing
Kuwait. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Kuwaitis Battling Huge Pools of Oil, N.Y. "TMEs, Apr. 21, 1992, at
Al. Nearly 100 more wells shooting geysers of oil failed to ignite. The environmental damage has
been quantified in a variety of ways. The burning wells released up to 500,000 tons of air pollution a
week with levels of airborne particles climbing up to 400 times U.S. EPA standards. The smoke
from the fires reached a ceiling of about 12,000 feet above sea level and the pollutants formed a dark
haze seen 300 miles away. See generally Michael Weiskopf, Oil Fire Pollution Assessed, WASH.
PosT, Apr. 4, 1991, at A25; Lee Hockstader, Toxic Gas Deepens Kuwait's Crisis, WASH. POST, Mar.
23, 1991, at Al. The economic devastation was assessed as a loss of 6 million barrels a day, approximating a daily revenue loss of $100-4120 million. Extinguishing the fires was initially projected to
take as long as five years, at an estimated cost of $430 million. That cost did not include the repair of
80 percent of the 1080 wells damaged by Iraq's occupation. See Hockstader, supra, at A16; William
Booth, Kuwait Seeks More Help in Combatting "Well Fires," WASH. PoST, Apr. 14, 1991, at A18.
By November 1991, the last of these oil well fires had been extinguished. Ibrahim, supra. Restoration of Kuwait's oil industry to its pre-invasion condition could cost $10 billion, although a new
environmental hazard in the form of huge oil lakes forming in the desert could increase the final bill
considerably. Id.
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This military action culminated a longstanding series of disputes

between the two states, including contests concerning territorial claims,
oil drilling practices, and economic competition over oil pricing prac-

tices.

6

Yet the escalation to overt military aggression was not out of

character for the government of Saddam Hussein. It is important to recall that a decade earlier, in September 1980, Iraq had invaded another
neighbor, Iran, as the latter was recovering from the upheavals of a domestic revolution. 7 The international community, after weighing the re-

spective dangers of supporting an aggressor authoritarian state (Iraq) or
a fundamentalist Shiite Islamic state (Iran), leaned in large part toward
neutrality. Yet, as one commentator observed, "The Iraqi decision to go
to war with Iran, backed by a solid Arab entente, . . . [was aimed at]
crippling Iran militarily and eliminating its political dominance of the
region once and for all."'" The international community failed to rebuke
Iraq sternly in 1980 for its aggression. In fact, several governments actually opted to support the Iraqi government-politically, militarily, and
emotionally. '9
Iraq's precedent for invading its neighbors was established, and arguably, tacit acceptance of that action was given by the international

community. Yet waging a war of aggression was not the only international norm breached by Iraq during its nearly eight years of fighting
with Iran. In 1984 and 1985, facing overwhelming numbers of enemy
troops on the battlefield, Iraq resorted to using chemical weapons against
Iranian forces,20 acts clearly in contravention of its obligation under the
15 Michael R. Gordon, Iraq Army Invades Capitalof Kuwait in Fierce Fighting, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 1990, at Al; R.W. Apple, Jr., Invading Iraqis Seize Kuwait and Its Oil; U.S. Condemns
Attack, Urges United Action, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1991, at Al.
16 Clyde H. Farnsworth, Bush, In FreezingAssets, Bans $30 Billion to Hussein, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 1990, at A9; IraqiInvasion, Step by Step, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1990, at A9. Hussein was
plagued by a worsening economic crisis following the cease-fire of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. Peace
brought a reduction of Persian Gulf state subsidies, international credits, and elevated oil production
rates keeping prices low for Iraqi exports. By May 1990, Iraq demanded of Kuwait and other states
cancellation of its Iran-Iraq war debts, additional economic aid, increased OPEC oil prices, control
of two Kuwaiti islands, and reparations for oil taken by Kuwait from the disputed Rumailah oil
field. For analysis of these issues, see William B. Quandt, The Middle East in 1990, FOREIGN AFF.,
America and the World 1990/1991, at 49, 51-53.
17 Werner Wiskari, Iraq Said to Gain Its BorderAims In Iran Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
1980, at Al.
18 Claudia Wright, Implications of the Iraq War, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 274, 291 (Winter
1980/1981).
19 As an irony of history, Iraq received political and financial support during its war with Iran
from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and even United States policy tilted towards a pro-Saddam Hussein
attitude in re-flagging 11 Kuwaiti tankers. For a multidimensional assessment of the Iran-Iraq War
see generally THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: LESSONS FOR STRATEGY, LAW AND DIPLOMACY (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1990).
20 Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Says Iraqis Use Poison Gas; Shultz and Baghdad Official Meet,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1985, at I1;
U.S. Makes Direct Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1985, at A8.
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1925 Geneva Protocol. 2 1 Once the threshold of violating the Geneva
Protocol had been surpassed, two chilling consequences occurred. First,
the decision and discretion to use chemical weapons on the battlefield
was passed by the Iraqi government to field commanders. Second, the
use of chemical weapons beyond the traditional inter-state conflict became more practical as Iraq waged chemical warfare against its own defenseless Kurdish citizens in 1988.22
Iraq also resorted to a campaign of economic dislocation. During
the war against Iran, Iraqi forces launched SCUD missiles to strike oil
pipelines, storage facilities, refineries, terminals, tankers, wells and offshore platforms. 23 It should not have been wholly unexpected, therefore,
that similar tactics might be invoked by Iraq against forces of the allied
coalition, especially at targets located in the Persian Gulf states.
Premeditated sabotage of a supertanker terminal to introduce millions of gallons of oil into the Persian Gulf's marine environment grossly
violated the spirit and the letter of both the law of environmental protection and the law of armed conflict. Indeed, the heinous nature of Iraq's
massive pollution of the Gulf's marine ecosystem provoked widespread
condemnation. One commentator exclaimed that "Hussein has shown
himself capable of holding the environment as his hostage."'24 President
Bush branded the policy "a deliberate act of environmental terrorism
that will hurt the entire world. ' 25 Such rhetoric prompted coining such
legally nebulous terms as "ecoterrorism" and "ecocide" to describe
Iraq's act of intentionally polluting the Gulf by oil.
Iraq's deliberate release of massive amounts of oil into the Persian
Gulf poses a fundamental question for international law. Does such a
tactic of massive marine pollution during wartime breach environmental
protection law, or some aspect of the law of armed conflict, or both? Put
another way, what real relevance does "the worst environmental disaster
in the history of the Persian Gulf region ' 26 hold for emerging international law?
21 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
22 Elaine Sciolino, Kurdish Chief GainsSupport in U.S. Visit, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1988, at 13;
More Chemical Attacks Reported, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1988, at 115; June Johnson, U.S. Asserts
Iraq Used Poison Gas Against the Kurds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1988, at Al.
23 See generally Phebe Marr, The Iran-Iraq War: The View from Iraq, in THE PERSIAN GULF
WAR, supra note 19, at 59. Cf. Eric Hooglund, Strategicand PoliticalObjectives in the Gulf War:
Iran's View, in id. at 39.
24 Thomas W. Lippman & William Booth, Oil SpreadingOff Kuwait PosesEcologicalDisaster,
WASH. Posr, Jan. 26, 1991, at A13.
25 Barton Gellman, Theories Vary on Motives for Spill, WASH. Posr, Jan. 26, 1991, at A13.
26 Dan Balz, GulfOil Slick Spreads Rapidly, WASH. PoST, Jan. 27, 1991, at Al.
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EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

In his 1949 essay "The Land Ethic," Aldo Leopold observed that
there is a need for every citizen to realize that the earth is not here for
humans to manipulate, but that we exist as part of an interrelated world.
As he put it, a "land ethic" "reflects the existence of an ecological conscience and this in turn reflects a conviction of individual responsibility
for the health of the land. Health is the capacity of the land for selfrenewal. Conservation is our effort to understand and preserve this
capacity." 2 7 Belief in this credo supplies the impetus for an ecological
ethic that furnishes the very foundation for global environmentalism. No
less important, it also represents an ecological ideal toward which humankind is urged to aspire.
Humans are viewed within this modern ecological ethic as an integral, interactive part of the whole global environment. While maintenance of a pristine environment would be ideal, that condition is not
realistic. Some degradation is inevitable. But the point is that man's activities should be directed so as to minimize harm done to the
environment.
The global ecological perspective, with its emphasis on respect for
environmental integrity, has come about only recently. The United Nations in 1972 produced a set of normative guidelines for states that embody fundamental principles of environmental preservation and
conservation. These guidelines were set out in the Declaration of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (the Stockholm
Declaration), articulated on June 16, 1972.28 As proclaimed in the Declaration's second principle, "natural resources of the earth, including the
air, water, land, flora, fauna and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be safeguarded." 2 9 There is little doubt that, with
respect to the Persian Gulf, this duty to safeguard those natural resources and ecosystems applied to all states.3 0
The Stockholm Declaration established other general principles that
have become more technical as the international community has mobilized to address ever pressing concerns, such as toxic pollutants and
dumping. These additional responsibilities are aimed at banning discharge practices that might inject serious or irreversible damage upon the
local ecosystem. Especially prohibited in this regard is discharge of toxic
27 ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND CouNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 221

(1949).
28 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972,

U.N. Doc. A/CONF .48/14 and Corr.1 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter
Stockholm Declaration].
29 Id. principle 2.
30 See Louis B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 423 (1973) (discussing the applicability of the Stockholm Declaration).
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substances and release of heat in such quantities or concentrations that
might damage the environment."
The Stockholm Declaration also emphasizes prevention of pollution.
States are required to take "all possible steps" to preclude pollution of
the seas by any substances that might be hazardous to human health, or
harm living marine resources, or damage amenities, or interfere "with
other legitimate uses of the sea." 32 The unprecedented magnitude of the
Gulf oil spill strongly suggests this international ecological norm was severely breached.
The keystone of the Stockholm Declaration's mandate against transnational pollution is found in its Principle 21. This provision at first
blush might seem to release a state from environmental protection responsibilities under the cloak of national sovereignty as it provides that
states have the "sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant
to their own environmental policies."3 3 Even so, Principle 21 goes on to
posit that states have "the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."3 4 This
fiat confirms the duty that states are bound not to create environmental
conditions or pollution circumstances that might injure the territory or
property of other states.3 5
To facilitate international cooperation, the concept of liabilitycompensation for wrongs done and damages committed whether intentional or not-has a long tradition in international law.36 This concept
of compensation finds expression in Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration which indicates that "States shall cooperate to develop further the
international law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of
pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within
the jurisdiction or control of such states to areas beyond their jurisdic31 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 28, principle 6.
32 Id. principle 7. Importantly, this phrase is repeated nearly verbatim in subsequent instruments intended to prevent marine pollution. See infra notes 45-61 and accompanying text.
33 Id. principle 21.

34 Id.
35 Importantly, this duty and the international legal principle of transfrontier protection had
been recognized and articulated in a number of earlier decisions by international tribunals. See, e.g.,
Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Canada), Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941); Corfu
Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (April 9); Lake Lanoux Case (Fr. v. Spain), 62 REVUE
GlNPRALE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 79-119 (1958), reprintedin 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 156
(1959).
36 See generally L.F.E. Goldie, Liabilityfor Damage and the ProgressiveDevelopment of InternationalLaw, 14 INI'L & COMp. L.Q. 1189 (1965); Sanford E. Gaines, InternationalPrinciplesfor
TransnationalEnvironmental Liability: Can Developments in Municipal Law Help Break the Impasse?, 30 HARv. INT'L L.J. 311 (1989).
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tion." s Interestingly, the wording "activities within the jurisdiction or
control" eliminates the potential dilemma (and subsequent loophole) of
determining the precise legal status of the territory from which the causal
activities occurred. A state would be responsible for damages, irrespective of whether its government possessed legal jurisdiction over another
territory (as Iraq claimed over Kuwait at the time), or was merely a belligerent occupation force, or had been evicted from the area.
It might be noted that the Stockholm Declaration offers a possible
caveat by which some state might seek to evade responsibility for its actions. In full, Principle 23 provides that:
Without prejudice to such criteria as may be agreed upon by the international community, or to standards which will have to be determined
nationally, it will be essential in all cases to consider the systems of
values prevailing in each country, and the extent of the applicability of
standards which are valid for the most advanced countries, but which
may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for the developing country.'8
In this context, a government might argue that its resort to widespread pollution as a weapon reflected either national, ethnic, or religious
norms, or represented a "poor-man's" weapon of mass destruction.
However, any of these contentions would be difficult to substantiate convincingly. In addition, one can not help but wonder how to square the
notion that destruction of the very resources necessary for development
could be deemed necessary to preserve a state's cultural integrity and
ensure its physical survival.39
The normative pillars of the Stockholm Declaration were built upon
a foundation of prior international conventions and regional agreements.' Even so, in support of the normative considerations that flowed
37 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 28, principle 22.
38 Id. principle 23.
39 In the case of Iraq and the Gulf spill, contemporary normative views of the Islamic world
were clearly expressed as most Arab governments overtly condemned Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, a fact evidenced by the prominent cooperation of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the
United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Qatar in the allied coalition against Iraq. Likewise, it would be
profoundly difficult for the Iraqi leadership to charge cultural bias against its national character by a
hostile (i.e., pro-Western) value system. A more plausible explanation for Saddam Hussein's actions
suggests that Iraq may have been deprived of the economic value of Kuwait's oil by the United
Nations' embargo, and thus had few inhibitions about testing the utility of that oil as a weapon.
40 One of the earliest modern agreements to deal with environmental protection was the 1959
Antarctic Treaty. This agreement prohibits nuclear explosions, the disposal of radioactive wastes,
and military fortification and maneuvers on the continent. The treaty also designated the area south
of 60* South Latitude as a region for scientific research, to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
Second, the 1963 Test Ban Treaty strongly asserted an ethic of environmental protection, in
banning all nuclear weapons tests in outer space, the earth's atmosphere and beneath the oceans.
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from the Stockholm Declaration, the international community has since
devised an extensive body of legal instruments for protecting the earth's
environment. 1 Especially pertinent in this regard are those international
instruments intended to safeguard against marine pollution.4 2
Over the past four decades, several agreements dealing with pollution from vessels have been promulgated, largely under the auspices of
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) (formerly the InterGovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization). 3 These international agreements set standards and regulations for pollution control,
while leaving enforcement in the hands of national governments. Global
rules to combat marine pollution have generally evolved from focusing
on ship-generated oil pollution, through a more comprehensive approach
to pollution, to the regulation of dumping activities, and finally, to the
very broad provisions currently found in the law of the sea." At present,
there are no specific global conventions that directly regulate pollution
from land-based sources or from offshore drilling platforms, since these
activities are more readily amenable to regulation through regional
instruments.
The first major international attempt specifically to curb pollution of
the seas by oil actually antedated the Stockholm Declaration and came
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Underwater, Aug.
5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
A third prominent international agreement that contributed to developing the concept of international environmental protection was the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. As provided for in its Article
IX,
States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the
introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, art. IX, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 2416-2417,
610 U.N.T.S. 205, 209-210.
Finally, in 1969, the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage established a system of international liability for environmental damage caused by oil spills. This
international agreement aims to impose penalties on bulk oil carriers which pollute the seas by oil.
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S.
3, 9 I.L.M. 45.
41 See, eg., Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 1979, 34 U.S.T. 3043,
18 I.L.M. 1442; Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S.
11,097, 26 I.L.M. 1529; Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541; and conventions cited infra notes 45-75.
42 See infra notes 45-82.
43 See Lawrence Juda, IMCO and the Regulation of Ocean Pollution from Ships, 26 INT'L &
Comp. L.Q. 558 (1977).
44 See generally Bernhard J. Abrahamsson, The Marine Environment and Ocean Shipping:
Some Implicationsfor a New Law of the Sea, 31 INT'L ORG. 291 (1977).
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with the promulgation in 1954 of the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Off.' This agreement specifically
prohibited the "discharge from any tanker... of oil [or] any oily mixture
the oil in which fouls the surface of the sea"'4 and set penalties commensurate with those that might be imposed under the law of the territory in
question.4 7 Amended in 1962 and 1969, this convention was the first
tentative move toward cleansing the oceans from oil pollutants and attaining a balance between responsibilities of flag and port states.48
Respective to the process of creating a norm that asserts nonpollution of the marine environment, two of the 1958 Geneva Conventions of
the Law of the Sea contain specific anti-pollution provisions. The Convention on the High Seas 4 9 obligates contracting parties to prevent pollution of the sea by the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines, or from
activities associated with the exploration and exploitation of the seabed
and subsoil, and to take measures that prevent pollution from the dumping of radioactive wastes. 50 The 1958 Convention on the Continental
Shelf" obligates parties to protect living resources of the sea from
"harmful agents" while in the process of offshore drilling.5 2 Taken in
tandem, these conventions codified two fundamental principles for international management of ocean pollution: (1) Freedom of the seas must
be exercised with reasonable regard to the interests of other states; and
(2) There exists the manifest need for states to preserve a reasonable balance between their needs and the ways and means in which they use
ocean space.
In the wake of the Stockholm Conference, a more significant step
was taken in 1973 with the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), s later modified by the Protocol of
1978 which introduced certain improvements into the Annex dealing
with oil pollution.54 Article 1 of MARPOL instructs the parties to "prevent the pollution of the marine environment by the discharge of harmful
substances or effluents containing such substances in contravention of the
45 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954, 12
U.S.T. 2989, 327 U.N.T.S. 3.
46 Id. art. 3.
47 Id. art. 6.
48 The Convention goes so far as to establish "prohibited zones" through which tankers should
not pass. Id. Annex A.
49 Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
50 Id. arts. 24-25.
51 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 312.
52 Id. art. 5.

53 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 12
I.L.M. 1319 [hereafter MARPOL 1973].
54 Protocol of 1978 Relating to MARPOL 1973, Feb. 17, 1978, I.L.M. 546 [hereinafter MARPOL
1978].

1992]

THE PERSIAN GULF WAR OIL SPILL

Convention.""5 The MARPOL 1973/78 Convention has five annexes,
numbers I and II of which are mandatory and deal with pollution by oil
and noxious substances, respectively.56 No question exists that this instrument represents a significant piece of global legislation that enjoys
broad authority in combatting pollution of the marine environment.
In 1972, the most important instrument for prohibiting the dumping of harmful substances from vessels at sea was promulgated as the socalled London Dumping Convention." This agreement builds on earlier
conventions by reiterating a pledge among contracting states to "take all
practicable steps to prevent the pollution of the sea by the dumping of
waste and other matter that is liable to create hazards to human health,
to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate use of the sea."5 " The London Dumping Convention in sum strives to control the amount and kinds of wastes dumped
into the oceans in order to prevent damage to marine life and human
opportunities.
Relatedly, the 1972 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft 9 reinforced the commitment
among states not to pollute the marine environment. Parties pledge "to
take all possible steps to prevent the pollution of the sea by substances
that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other
legitimate uses of the sea."'
Perhaps the Convention most directly relevant to the act of discharging oil, though not directly applicable to the Gulf area, is the 1974
55 MARPOL 1973, supra note 53, art. I. "Harmful substances" are defined to include "any
substance which, if introduced into the sea, is liable to create hazards to human health, to harm
living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the
sea, and includes any substance subject to control by the present Convention." Id. art. I, para. 2.
56 MARPOL 1973, supra note 53, Annex I: Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil,
at 1335; Annex II: Regulations for the Control of Pollution by Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk,
at 1386; Annex III: Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Harmful Substances Carried by
Sea in Packaged Forms, or in Freight Containers, Portable Tanks or Road and Rail Tank Wagons,
at 1421; Annex IV: Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Sewage from Ships, at 1424;
Annex V: Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Garbage from Ships, at 1434.
57 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120.
58 Id. art. I. "Dumping" is defined as "any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter
from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea." Id. art. 3, para. 1.
59 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft,
Feb. 15, 1972, 932 U.N.T.S. 5.
60 Id. art. 1. As defined in the Convention, "dumping" refers to "any deliberate disposal of
substances and materials into the sea by or from ships or aircraft," other than incidental discharges
from the normal operations of ships or for "purposes other than the mere disposal thereof, if not
contrary to the aim of this Convention." Id. art. 19, para. 1. "Ships" include fixed or floating
platforms. Id. art. 19, para. 2.
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Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based
Sources. 61 This agreement specifically forbids the act of deliberately discharging oil into the marine environment. Under this convention the
parties pledge that they will
take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the sea, by which is
meant the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or
energy into the marine environment (including estuaries) resulting in
such deleterious effects as hazards to human health, harm to living
resources and to marine eco-systems, damae
to amenities or interfer6
ence with other legitimate uses of the sea.
The convention also would obligate parties to assist each other to
prevent incidents that might result in pollution from land-based sources,
as well as to minimize and eliminate the consequences of such incidents
and to exchange information to facilitate that goal.6 3
International agreements designed to prevent accidents at sea undoubtedly strengthen the global regime of marine environmental protection law against pollution by oil. Five principal instruments, all drafted
under the auspices of IMO, are presently in force: the 1966 Convention
on Load Lines; 61 the 1972 Convention on Safe Containers; 65 the 1972
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
Sea;66 the 1974 Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea;67 and the 1978
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
for Seafarers.6 8
Especially important as environmental protection law for the Persian Gulf region is the 1978 Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-Operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution.6 9
This instrument was designed to develop an integrated management approach to the marine environment of the Persian Gulf region. The purpose of the convention specifically obligates contracting parties to take
"all appropriate measures" to "prevent, abate, and combat pollution in
61 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, June 4, 1974,
13 I.L.M. 352.
62 Id. art. 1.
63 Id. art. 13.

64 Apr. 5, 1966, 18 U.S.T. 1857, 640 U.N.T.S. 133.
65 Dec. 2, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 3707, 1064 U.N.T.S. 3.
66 Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16.
67 Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 14 I.L.M. 963.
68 July 7, 1978, reprintedin 6A BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, Doc. No. 9-38 (7th ed. 1987).
69 Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine From Pollution, Apr. 24, 1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 133, 17 I.L.M. 511 [hereinafter Kuwait Convention] (entered
into force June 1, 1979), reprinted in PETER H. SAND, MARINE ENVIRONMENT LAW IN THE
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PROGRAMME 58 (1988). The following states are parties

to the Kuwait Convention: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates. Id. at 256.
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the Sea Area"" ° caused by "intentional or accidental discharges from
ships."'7 1 Furthermore, the convention obligates parties to
take all appropriate measures to prevent, abate and combat pollution
in the Sea Area caused by dumping of wastes and other matter from
ship and aircraft, and ...ensures effective compliance in the Sea Area
with applicable rules relating to the control of this type of pollution as
provided for in relevant international conventions.7 2
Given the heavy tanker traffic sailing through the Persian Gulf, the
main intent of the 1978 Kuwait Convention aims at curbing pollution of
the sea by oil. Highlighting this point is a special protocol for combating
73
pollution by oil and other harmful substances in cases of emergency.
Dumping is not defined in the convention, nor were annexes appended to
identify what harmful or noxious substances might present particular
threats to marine life, fisheries, or human health in the region. Even so,
the fact remains that, regarding dumping, the Kuwait Convention intends to ensure effective compliance with existing international conventions relating to this type of pollution.7 4 At the very least, then, the
legally binding obligations in the London Dumping Convention and
MARPOL 73/78 would be pertinent to the dumping or discharging of
any substances into the gulf by ships or littoral states. Accordingly, the
deliberate release of toxic petroleum into the Persian Gulf marine ecosystem would be expressly forbidden.
Finally, not to be overlooked is the broad anti-pollution mandate
articulated in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. 75 The relevant
environmental protection provisions comprise Part XII of this agreement, providing for the "protection and preservation of the marine environment."'76 In a real sense, these provisions are not merely a
restatement of existing conventional law or state practice. Rather, they
create a new public international legal framework to deal with degradation of and threats to the marine environment. Article 192 unequivocally
fixes the principal duty of states relative to the marine environment:
"States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment." 7 The obligatory language is unshakable. States that violate this
fiat to protect and preserve the marine environment thus violate interna70

Kuwait Convention, supra note 69, art. III, para. A.

71

Id. art. IV.

72 Id.

art. V.

73 Id. Protocol concerning Regional Cooperation in Combatting Pollution by Oil and Other

Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency.
74 Id. Preamble.
75 United Nations Convention on the Law and the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter 1982 LOS CONVENTION].
76 Id. arts. 192-237.
77 Id. art. 192.
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tional law. Indeed, Article 235 substantiates this conclusion as it affirms
that "States are responsible for the fulfillment of their international obligations concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment. They shall be liable in accordance with international law." 7
Article 194 further strengthens these provisions by imposing an affirmative duty on states not to pollute. This article indicates that the
Convention is concerned with "all sources of pollution of the marine environment, and states are mandated to take all measures necessary to
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from
any source."7 9 With respect to land-based pollution, the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention directs states to take legislative action "to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based
sources ... taking into account internationally agreed rules, standards
and recommended practices and procedures." 8 Moreover, states are directed to adopt laws and take measures necessary "to prevent, reduce
and control pollution" from dumping.8" To this end, governments are
obliged to "endeavor to establish global and regional rules," with national anti-pollution legislation being "no less effective . . . than the
global rules and standards."8 "
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention underscores the principal
premise of the law of environmental protection, namely that the component parts of the global ecosystem are interrelated, and sensitive to alteration elsewhere in the system. Furthermore, the entire environmental
system, though self-renewing, is threatened by burgeoning population
growth, rising expectations for socio-economic development and the resultant output of greater amounts of pollution." Unfortunately, the
oceans have become the repository of much of this manmade waste.
As regards ocean space, the principles of the law of environmental
protection clearly assert that states are responsible for controlling pollu84
tion of the sea that might cause damage to another state's territory.
The principle of good neighborliness requires that states not permit acts
78 Id. art. 235, para. 1.

Id. art. 194, para. 1.
Id. art. 207, para. 1.
Id. art. 210, paras. I & 2.
Id. art. 210, paras. 4 & 6. For a thoughtful assessment of the 1982 LOS CoNVENTI No's
contribution to the law of pollution prevention see Moira L. McConnell & Edgal Gold, The Modern
Law of the Sea: Frameworkfor the Protection andPreservationof the MarineEnvironment?, 23 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 83 (1991).
83 See generally the assessment made by the WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987).
84 See generally G. HandI, Liability as an Obligation Establishedby a PrimaryRule ofInternational Law: Some Basic Reflections on the InternationalLaw Commission's Work, 16 NETH. Y.B.
INT'L L. 49 (1985); Pierre-Marie Dupoy, The InternationalLaw of State Responsibility: Revolution or
Evolution?, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 105 (1989).
79
80
81
82
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within their territory or jurisdictional competence to be done when they
might negatively impact on the rights of neighbors.85 Put tersely, states
do not have the right to contaminate international common space areas
86
such as the high seas for their own national expediency or convenience.
They are obligated to preserve and protect those regions, not only in
their own interests, but for the interests of all mankind.8 7
There is little question that this partial enumeration of pertinent international and regional agreements affirms the normative rule that states
are not permitted to pollute the oceans either at will or with impunity.
Each agreement alone constitutes an element of international law binding
upon its signatories. Taken together, these agreements have acquired the
quality and force of an international norm that mandates that governments have a duty not to pollute international ocean space.88
In addition to the treaties and conventions which supply useful evidence of international law, a second principal source of the law of environmental protection is found in the normal practice and custom of
states.8 9 Indeed, a combination of both the actual behavior of states and
the opinions of legal scholars and practitioners in the form of opinion
juris furnishes the foundation for international customary law. 90 What
has become evident from the multitude of documents and treaties, traditional practices, and professional opinions is that an international consensus has emerged, recognizing the need for states to have an obligation
to protect the environment. 91 According to this conclusion, Iraq
breached the emerging international norm of environmental protection.
IV.

EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

Acknowledging that humanity constitutes but a part of the global
ecology, the struggle to regulate social conflict reveals a growing under85 See, eg., Trial Smelter Case, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1911.
86 See generally KARI HAKAPAX, MARINE POLLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1981).
87 See generally JAN SCHNEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TOWARDS
AN INTERNATIONAL ECOLOGICAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION (1979); Schachter, supra note 1.
88 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED

STATES § 601 (1987).
89 Sources for international environmental law conform to sources of general international law,
as expressed in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. These include respectively, "[treaties and] international conventions," "international custom," "the general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations," and "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most qualified
publicists." U.N. CHARTER, Stat. I.C.J., art. 38.
90 See generally H.W.A. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION: AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONTINUING ROLE OF CUSTOM IN THE PRESENT PERIOD OF
CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972).

91 This obligation has become highlighted in recent years by the emergence of global warming
and ozone depletion as serious international concerns. See Ved P. Nanda, Trends in International
Environmental Law, 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 187 (1989-1990).
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standing of the impact that war exacts upon the environment. There is
little question that war occurs as an all too regular activity of man's existence. Moreover, despite all attempts to limit and outlaw it, war seems

driven by natural impulse and may occur as an inevitable consequence of
international competition. This conclusion does not bode well for the
environment, particularly since the ultimate product of war is the destruction of life and property.
The conduct of warfare, however, has not gone unregulated.9 2 Since
antiquity, religious and philosophical systems have sought to institutionalize war and to subject it to the rule of legal principles. Philosophers
and writers including Thucydides,93 Aristotle,94 Plato," Augustine,96
and Thomas Aquinas97 explored the general rationale that leaders of the
empire or the church possessed the discretion to choose the justification
for war, but the means, including laws, should be developed through
customary practice among equals (i.e. sovereigns).9" It is only in modern
times, however, that the impacts of war on the environment have assumed such salience as to be elevated to international legal concern.
By the time of Grotius during the 16th century, the two conceptual
threads of the evolving laws of war-namely, the justification for war
and the conduct of war-began to unravel.99 A rift between the two
doctrines developed. Nearly two centuries later, the "positivist" element
See generally THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOAND OTHER DOCUMENTS (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988); THE LAW
OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).
93 THUCYDIDES, THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, bk. VII, para. 68 (Richard
Livingstone ed., Richard Crawley & Richard Feetham trans., 1954).
94 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, bk. I, para. 8, at 11 & bk. VII, para. 14, at 178-179 (Stephen
Everson ed., 1988).
95 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, bk. II, at 51 (Allan Bloom trans., 1968) (Platonic pagination reference 373d-374d).
96 SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, bk. III, at 103-106, bk. XXI, at 786 (Marcus Dods
trans., 1950).
97 See THE "SUMMA THEOLOGIA" OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, PART II (SECOND PART), Question XL (On War), at 500 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Burns Oates &
Washbourne Ltd., 1916).
98 During the decline of the empires, the institution of the emperor as sovereign lost credibility
and power. Joachin von Elbe describes what remained of this antiquated system at the onset of the
Middle Ages:
The ius commune of the Empire continued to exercise a "supra-national power" for the
maintenance of justice and peace in the world. The limitation and regulation of wars between the members of the Empire thus becomes a matter of positive law; it is treated by
secular lawyers of the Middle Ages in the familiar terms of the Corpus furis.
Joachim von Elbe, The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in InternationalLaw, 33 AM. J.
INT'L L. 665, 670-71 (1939).
99 Von Elbe posited that in 1582, Ayala (a major influence on Grotius) was the first to make
the actual distinction between the two concepts. This provocative departure from traditional
thought notes that "the justice of the cause, though still considered as a necessary prerequisite for
92
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matured in the work of Emmerich de Vattel, who distinguished between
the "necessary law of nature" and the "voluntary law of nations."'"
Whereas the former concerned natural law and the conscience of sovereigns, the latter addressed the law
that nations applied voluntarily in
10 1
their relations with one another.
The elevated status of positivist law suggested that only in regard to
the necessary law of nature may the question of a war's just cause be
raised. The voluntary law of nations, i.e., positivist international law,
sought not to venture into the intrinsic justice of wars."°2 In sum, the
continued development of the positivist school came about at the expense
of the law-of-nature focus.10 3 By the late 19th century, positivist legal
theorists had largely rejected the distinction between "just" and "unjust"
wars, and had relegated war to an act entirely driven by the uncontrolled
sovereign will of each individual state."° Justification for war had been
downgraded to only a secondary consideration, a trend perhaps attributed to the exponential increase in the destructife capability of modern
warfare.10 5 The righteousness of a sovereign's cause proved little solace
to combatants, innocent civilians, and the maimed as they were increasingly drawn into belligerent situations.10 6 Hence, international law was
turned away from considerations of moral purpose or ethical transgression and was redirected to more pragmatic concerns of damage

limitation. 107
The occasion ripened for codification of these positivist norms and
customs.'0 8 As a result, the laws of armed conflict were born out of the
going to war in accordance with the prevailing doctrine, has no legal effect whatever upon the conduct of the war; it relates to politics and equity rather than to law." Id., at 676 (emphasis added).
100 MONSIER DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 381-382 (Joseph Chitty
trans., 1852).
101 See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF PEACE 37-40 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963).
102 As Werner Levi has observed:
The rise of positivism and the simultaneous decline of the naturalist theory of law-or, in
other words, the ostensible elimination of value judgments about legal norms so as to facilitate the growth of law in a multicultural world-legitimized the conduct of wars for the
enforcement of political demands even without a legal basis or "just cause."
WERNER LEVI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (2d ed. 1991).
103 BRIERLY, supra note 101, at 37-38.
104 GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (6th ed. 1992).
105 Id. at 670 & 699.
106 See generally J. DAVID SINGER & MELVIN SMALL, THE WAGES OF WAR, 1816-1965, A
STATISTICAL HANDBOOK (1972).
107 VON GLAHN, supra note 104, at 33 & 670.
10 KALSHOVEN, supra note 3, at 7-18.
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Hague Conferences in 1899 and 1907 through a series of conventions.' °9
These documents, while addressing some issues of justification, focused
mainly on the conduct of war. With a codified regime for warfare in
place, the onset of conflict would produce legal consequences for belligerents and third parties alike, irrespective of the possibility that its outbreak may or may not have involved the abrogation of a specific
international normative obligation. 1 0
Bolstered by the two Hague Conferences, positivists clearly gained
the ascendence and asserted that justice, righteousness and rectitude had
little role to play in a world regulated by conventions and arms control
agreements. The sobering experience of massive death and destruction
wrought by World War I, however, brought about a reconsideration of
these attitudes."' International legal opinion came to accept the belief
that states are culpable for initiating a policy of warfare." 2 This revival
of accountability, coupled with the associated sense of righteousness in
the Versailles Treaty, rekindled international legal efforts to distinguish
between just and unjust wars,
a responsibility that had largely been ig113
nored since the late 1700s.
Regrettably, neither philosophically highlighting war's ethical status, nor the Kellogg-Briand pact outlawing aggressive war as an instrument of national policy," 4 nor even the availability of the League of
Nations were able to prevent World War II. Damage to society and the
environment outstripped attempts to control international conflict. At
the conclusion of World War II, however, the international community
moved quickly on both philosophical fronts. The positivist doctrine was
bolstered by the Nuremberg Tribunal as it held that principles in the
Hague Conventions on Land Warfare of 1899/1907 conveyed the force
of customary law that would be binding even upon non-signatory states.
Those adhering to the "necessary law of nature" school were won over
109 See International Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War by Land, July
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, [hereinafter Hague II]; Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague IV].
110 See voN GLAHN, supra note 104, at 834-869 (discussing the concept of neutrality); Patrick
M. Norton, Between the Ideology and the Reality: The Shadow of the Law of Neutrality, 17 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 249 (1976).
111 See VON GLAHN, supra note 104, at 33 & 670-674.
112 Id. at 670.
113 See generally WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR (1981);
MICHAEL WALZER, Jusr AND UNJUST WARS (1977).

114 Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy. Aug.
27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. As provided for in this agreement, the contracting parties
"condemn[ed] recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounced it as an
instrument of national policy in their relations with one another." Id. art. 1. Moreover, parties
agreed that "the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever
origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."
Id. art. 2.
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by the creation of both crimes against peace and crimes against humanity
15 and subsequently codified in
as evinced in the Nuremberg experience
1 16
the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Again, war did not end with the entry into force of new international legal constraints. The experience of the Korean and Vietnam wars
sparked negotiations in 1977 of two Additional Protocols to the 1949
Geneva Conventions. 1 17 The emphasis of international law shifted back
to positivism as Protocol I, dealing with the protection of victims of international conflict, refocused attention on the means and methods of
warfare.' 1 8 Importantly, it is within this positivist approach of stressing
methods and means for waging war that environmental issues have come
to be forthrightly addressed. It is apparent that the "just" or "unjust"
nature of a conflict in modern times hardly affects the means of waging

contemporary warfare. It is thus within the positivist school of the law
of armed conflict that the link has been made to the law protecting the
environment.11 9
V.

ASSESSMENT

The law of armed conflict generally is a civilized international attempt to control the social phenomenon of war. 12 ° Through international consensus, states have been lawfully deprived of unlimited choice
115 See Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178 (1946); VON
GLAHN, supra

note 104, at 885-886.

116 See generally Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick

in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Geneva Convention IV.
117 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter
Protocol 1]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter Protocol II].
118 See generally HOWARD S. LEVIE, PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS: PROTOCOL I TO THE
1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS (1981).

119 This point is demonstrated by restrictions in Protocol I of 1977 on methods and means of
warfare that are intended or expected to have long-term or severe damage on the environment. See
infra notes 143-145 and accompanying text. Interestingly enough, these violations are not considered to be grave breaches under Protocol I. KALSHOVEN, supra note 3, at 133.
120 See generally BARRIE PASKINS & MICHAEL DOCKRILL, THE ETHICS OF WAR (1979);
HOWARD S. LEVIE, THE CODE OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (1986); Geoffrey Best, The
Restraint of War in Historicaland PhilosophicalPerspective, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD

3 (Astrid J.M. Delissen & Gerard J. Tanga eds., 1991).
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in their means of inflicting damage upon an enemy.1 2 As warfare has
moved from the battlefield to affect population centers, the law of armed

conflict has placed increased emphasis on special protection of civilians
and property, such that today, through convention and custom, wanton
122
destruction of property clearly violates the law of armed conflict.
The law of armed conflict is governed by two fundamental principles, necessity and proportionality. 1 23 Respective to necessity, if it can be
convincingly demonstrated that the use of armed force is necessary to
preserve public order, that determination may legally justify the use of
armed force. 24 A threat125must be real and imminent, however, not
imagined or hypothetical.
Under the same concept, necessity allows a military commander to
use only that degree and kind of force required to accomplish the mission's objective. 126 This brings forth the notion of proportionality as a
criteria for use of force.127 In this respect, the limitation of proportionality restricts the options available to a commander in gauging the military
necessity of a given action in two ways: (1) the principle of humanitarian
concern; and (2) the doctrine of economy of forces.1 28
Humanitarian issues reflect not only custom and respect for the
combatants, but also represent both good will and good faith. It is reasonable to treat the defeated enemy's army well. Fair treatment encour121 See generally GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE: THE MODERN HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS (1980); THE HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CON-

FLiCT (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979).
122 While custom and intent had stressed protection of noncombatants, such trends were not
codified until the 20th century. At the close of World War II, "the Principles of International Law
Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal ma[d]e it a war crime to plunder public or
private property, wantonly destroy cities, towns or villages, or perform devastation not justified by
military necessity." The Charter and Judgment of the Nurmberg Tribunal: History and Analysis,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5, citing Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6(b), Aug. 8,
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
123 See ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NA-

VAL OPERATIONS, NWP 9 (REV.A)/FMFM 1-10 (1989), at 5-4 to 5-7 [hereinafter LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS].

124 See generally Weiden, Necessity in InternationalLaw, in 24 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SocIETY 105 (1939); William Gerard Downey, Jr., The Law of War andMilitaryNecessity, 47
AM. J. INT'L L. 251 (1953).

125 See generally N.C.H. Dunbar, The Significance of Military Necessity in the Law of War, 67
JURID. REV. 201 (1955).

126 This principle is known as "economy of force." See infra notes 131-133 and accompanying
text.
127 The rule of proportionality is codified in Protocol I, supra note 117, arts. 51(5)(b) &
57(2)(a)(ii)-(iii). See generally William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionalityand Protocol I in
Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91 (1982). See also LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra

note 123, at 5-6 to 5-7 n.6.
128 LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 123, at 5-7.

1992]

THE PERSLIN GULF WAR OIL SPILL

ages reciprocity and reduces ill will. 12 9 The unwarranted destruction of
life, land and property runs contrary to the norms and expectations of
humanity, as well as the need for world public order."' 0
In addition to the humanitarian concern, which strikes a strong responsive moral chord in the jurist, it is the highly pragmatic military
doctrine of "economy of force" that plays an even more salient role in
influencing military decisions.1 3 1 Economy of force is the minimum
force needed to accomplish the military objective. 13 2 As noted officially
by the U.S. Department of the Navy, military necessity "permits a belligerent to apply only that degree and kind of regulated force, not otherwise
prohibited by the laws of war, required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy133with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and
physical resources."
129 As well put in an authoritative military supplement on international law:
As long as war is not abolished, the law of armed conflict remains essential. During such
conflicts the law of armed conflict provides common ground of rationality between enemies. This body of law corresponds to their mutual interests during conflict and constitutes a bridge for a new understanding after the end of the conflict. The law of armed
conflict is intended to preclude purposeless, unnecessary destruction of life and property
and to ensure that violence is used only to defeat the enemy's military forces. If followed
by all participants, the law of armed conflict will inhibit warfare from needlessly affecting
persons or things of little military value. By preventing needless cruelty, the bitterness and
hatred arising from armed conflict is lessened, and thus it is easier to restore an enduring
peace.
Id. at n.7.
130 See JEAN PICET, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICIMS 28-29
(1975); Respective to the legal relationship between the doctrine of military necessity and the principle of humanitarian concern, the Nuremberg Trial case of United States v. List made these relevant
observations:
[Military necessity] permits the destruction of life of armed enemies and other persons
whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the armed conflicts of war; it allows the
capturing of armed enemies and others of peculiar danger, but it does not permit the killing
of innocent inhabitants for purposes of revenge or the satisfaction of a lust to kill. The
destruction of property to be lawful must be imperatively demanded by the necessities of
war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law. There must be some
reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of enemy
forces.
United States v. List, 11 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under
Control Council Law No. 10, 1230, 1253 (1948).
131 "Economy of force" is one of the cardinal "principles of war" adopted by the U.S. armed
forces as service doctrine. See LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 123, table ST5-1, at 5-9;
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE, JOINT STAFF OFFICER'S GUIDE, Pub. 1,para. 102, at 1-4 and fig.
1-1, at 1-5 (1986).
132 "Economy of force" means that "no more - or less - effort should be devoted to a task
than is necessary to achieve the objective." LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 123, at 5-8
n.8.
133 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE § 220(a) (1955). The
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 concerning the protection of civilian persons during war was
constructed upon this principled foundation. Article 53 in the Convention provides that:
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Yet the twin pillars of military necessity are not mutually exclusive.
Use of the "economy of forces" principle can also be elevated to the humanitarian appeal contained in the law of armed conflict. Application of
economy of force during the implementation of a military campaign contributes to military efficacy. Indeed, to destroy objects of ecological value
that are not deemed necessary military objectives is not an economical
use of force; it expends military capability without returning any net gain
in military advantage. By the same token,134pragmatic utilitarians will defend such conservation practices as well.
To summarize, the use of force in international law is delicately balanced between the precepts of military necessity and proportionality as
articulated within the following context: (a) force must be regulated;
(b) force must be necessary; (c) a commander must use the minimum
force necessary; and (d) force must not otherwise be forbidden by legally
binding law of armed conflict, orders from a superior, non-binding rules
of engagement, or any other legal fiat. 135
This same principle can be extrapolated to environmental considerations as well. Wanton destruction of the environment diverts limited
military resources away from the penultimate military purpose of terminating the war once favorable military objectives have been achieved.
Philosophically, both laws for environmental protection and armed
conflict share the fundamental concept of conservation.1 36 This driving
principle of conservation undergirds the normative quality as well as
practical utility of both bodies of international law. Importantly, the
legal implications of the Gulf War oil spill supply a confluence for the
law of environmental protection and the law of armed conflict-a confluence that magnifies the unlawfulness of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.
The intuitive normative wrongs consequently find form and substance in
Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to
social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, excepted where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 116, art. 53.
134 As R. B. Brand has observed,

The measure of permissible devastation is found in the strict necessities of war. Devastation as an end in itself or as a separate measure of war is not sanctioned by the law of war.
There must be some reasonably close connection between the destruction of property and
the overcoming of the enemy's army.
R.B. Brandt, Utilitarianismand the Rules of War, in WAR AND MORAL REsPoNmBILrry 25, 38-39
(Marshall Cohen et al. eds., 1975).
135 See generally LAW OF NAVAL OPERAMrONS, supra note 123; William H. Parks, Command
Responsibilityfor War Crimes, 62 MIL L. REV. 1 (1973).
136 In this sense, "conservation" embodies the notion that the law preserves, guards, and protects society from excessive loss, injury, or decay resulting from armed conflict or environmental
degradation.
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violations of the codified international laws for both environmental protection and regulation of armed conflict.
VI.

THE LEGAL NEXUS BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AND ARMED CONFLICT

Viewed within the dual contexts of environmental law and the laws
of war, it is not difficult to conclude that by unleashing the massive oil
spill the Iraqi leadership abrogated certain regional and international
legal responsibilities. But which set of laws might furnish the most effective or most appropriate means for lodging claims against Iraq? The prevailing opinion suggests that protection of the environment must fall
within recognized principles in the law of armed conflict.13 7 This point
rings especially true given that Iraq released the oil spill as a deliberate
policy during a situation of belligerency.
Drawing upon the doctrine of military necessity and the common
theme of conservation, the law of environmental protection would hold a
special place in developing charges and shaping arguments against the
Iraqi government. It is because of this system of shared ethics that the
law of environmental protection can be employed to bolster facets of the
law of armed conflict that relate to limiting environmental damage during war. Furthermore, it serves to prohibit manipulation or degradation
of the environment for belligerent purposes.
Preeminence of the law of armed conflict may be explained by its
long tradition in both international custom and state practice. 138 As previously noted, humanitarian and environmental philosophies, principles
and practices during war have been contemplated and codified for centuries.1 39 The law of the environment, on the other hand, has
only recently
14 °
attracted the attention of the international community.
The 1954 Oil Spill Convention marked the first major attempt to
address worldwide environmental concerns.1 4 1 The 1972 Stockholm
Declaration and progressive development of ocean law culminating in
137 To support this assertion, one need only realize that more than 160 states in the international community have ratified the four 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Law of War. Theodor
Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 348, 348 n.2. (1987). In
contrast, laws for the protection of the environment still await the inception, let alone widespread
ratification, of such a quasi-universal convention.
138 See supra notes 92-98.
139 See supra notes 99-119.
140 The law of armed conflict has been evolving since before the time of Grotius, in the sixteenth century. However, it was only in 1972 that the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment set the modem beginning of environmental concerns in international law. See Christopher
C. Joyner & Nancy D. Joyner, GlobalEco-Management and InternationalOrganizations:The Stockholm Conference and Problems of Cooperation, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 533 (1974).
141 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Convention over the subsequent decade reflected truly bold and global thinking pertaining to environmental issues.142 Yet, as codified international law, the law of
environmental protection has evolved only since World War II. Though
obviously possessing considerable importance, the law of environmental
protection does not yet command the same degree of broad-based historical familiarity or global acceptance as does the law of armed conflict.
No less important is that the international community, drawing
upon the heightened awareness and sensitivities of environmental issues,
is working to integrate such concerns into the body of armed conflict law.
Protocol I, promulgated in 1977, incorporates the fundamental consensus regarding environmental protection against military activities. 143 Article 35 of that instrument sets the following as basic rules in
international law for the methods and means of warfare:
1. In any armed conflict, the right of the parties to the conflict to
choose methods of warfare is not unlimited.
2. It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
3. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment. 144
Importantly, Protocol I reaffirms the international community's humanitarian concerns during the course of conflict. To this end there exists a
convergence of ideals in Protocol I. In particular, the intention is that
the "Law of the Hague," developed mainly with interstate rules governing the use of force, and the "Law of Geneva," developed to ensure
protection of persons from the effects of armed conflicts, should dovetail
in substantial degree.1 45 Such a convergence not only supplies greater
coincidence in the law regulating the use of force; it also serves to reinforce the nature and normative quality of that law.
The broad foundation of the law of armed conflict, rich in both detail and history, prompts the conclusion that it will retain greater consequence and heavier legal weight than the more recently emergent
142 See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
143 See KALSHOVEN, supra note 3, at 81 (noting that the proponents of this "new basic rule"
were probably motivated in this environmental prohibition by the "large-scale deforestations carried
out by the Americans in the course of the war in Vietnam.").
144 Protocol I, supra note 117, art. 35.
145 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 35 of Protocol I reaffirm the two classical principles of the
"Law of the Hague." Id. paras. 1-2. These principles are then supplemented by the modernized
paragraph 3. Id. para. 3; KALSHOVEN, supra note 3, at 80-81. Importantly, the general principles
of the "Law of the Hague" have in large part passed into customary international law. Meron, supra
note 137.
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environmental law. Perpetration of "widespread, long-term and severe
damage" 1" to the environment is specifically violative of Protocol I of
the law of armed conflict; 147 it has not, however, been made a specific
norm formally expressed in widely recognized tenets of environmental
international law as such.
Ideally, the law of environmental protection should produce a record of acceptance equally impressive to that for armed conflict. More
likely, however, environmental law's greatest impact will be relegated to
setting out necessary limitations on the means, methods and objects of
war. Thus, pertaining to the Gulf War oil spill, the international course
of reaction most likely will turn to violations of the law of armed conflict.
The interface between the two complimentary bodies of international law
thus becomes apparent. A critical need arises to consider ecological principles and experiences of environmental protection law when interpreting
the environmental aspects of the law of armed confiict. This recommendation underpins evaluation of the Gulf War oil spill under international
law as well as considering conceivable explanations for Iraq's action.
VII.

INTENT AND APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
RESPONSES

The Persian Gulf is a narrow, shallow body of water that is virtually
landlocked. No rivers flow into it from the Saudi side, and the only significant water exchange is with the Indian Ocean, through the Strait of
Hormuz. As such, dispersal of massive oil spills in the Persian Gulf is
difficult and protracted.14
The devastating oil spill released into the Persian Gulf shortly after
hostilities broke out between the allied coalition and Iraq deeply disturbed the international community. 4 9 Almost immediately, rationales
were put forward to understand Saddam Hussein's pursuit of such a noxious strategy. Three theories surfaced to explain Iraq's motivation:
(1) the oil spill had a military purpose, i.e., it would create a defensive
Protocol I, supra note 117, art. 35, para. 3.
While this may be so, the undefined extent and vague scope of such "widespread, long-term
and severe damage" leaves substantial room for vagaries in interpretation and application.
148 For a discussion of the relevant geography of the Persian Gulf, see Christopher C. Joyner,
Introduction: The Geography and Geopolitics of the Persian Gulf, in THE PERSIAN GULF WAR,
supra note 19, at 1, 2-4.
149 See Schneider, supra note 8; Shenon, supra note 13. In the wake of Iraq's oil spill, the U.S.
Senate passed a resolution urging the administration to pursue an international tribunal for war
crimes committed by Iraq during its occupation war. David Hoffman, US.: No Plans to Try Saddam in Absentia, WAsH. PosT, Apr. 24, 1991, at A24. The European Community asked the United
Nations to explore charges against Iraq during the Gulf War as well. Id. In addition, the U.N.
Security Council voted to hold Iraq responsible for violations of international law. Id.
146
147
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barrier of gooey beaches to impede against an amphibious assault by
the allied coalition;
(2) it was a terror tactic, as averred by President Bush's description of
the incident as an act of "environmental terrorism" to befoul desalination plants in Saudi Arabia. (Though open to conjecture, a related
theory suggested that Iraq aimed to dispirit public opinion or perhaps
even outrage the coalition into premature assault); and/or
(3) there was actually no strategy, release of the oil slick was merely
one in a series of tactical probes by Iraq that sought to test allied forces
and possibly disrupt them. 150

Determination of intent remains an important step towards identifying
specific violations of the law of armed conflict, as well as appropriate
international responses.
Regarding the possibility of a military purpose, attacks upon the en-

vironment as a means of waging war are not new. History is replete with
episodes in which belligerents have attempted to defeat the enemy by
attacking the environment.15 Within the framework of military purpose, Iraq's oil pollution may be explained as a defensive act aimed 152
at
slowing, diverting, or deterring an impending amphibious assault.

The Iraqi leadership might have reasoned that a "scorched-earth"--or
put more aptly, a "spoiled-sea" policy-was both required and lawful,

given its situation of desperation. Indeed, the law of armed conflict does
acknowledge that a scorched-earth policy of belligerents may at times be
rendered a proper action of military necessity. 5 3 Such a sentiment is
150 Gellman, supra note 25.
151 See SIPRI, WARFARE IN A FRAGILE WORLD: MILITARY IMPAcT ON THE HUMAN ENvIRONMENT 14-19 (Rajesh Kumar ed., 1980). Examples of ravaging the environment as part of a
belligerent's military strategy are legion. In 1980, SIPRI catalogued 26 major "ecologically disruptive wars" in history, which included among them the following: The Peloponnesian War (431-404
B.C.), Third Punic War (149-146 B.C.), Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), Napoleonic Wars (17961815), U.S. Civil War (1861-1865), World War I (1914-1918), World War 11 (1939-1945), Korean
War (1950-1953), Second Indochina War (1961-1975), and the Kampuchean Insurrections (19751977). Id.
152 See Apple, supra note 7; Shenon, supra note 13.
153 As provided for in the Hague Regulations, "military necessity" does not convey a license to
destroy. It permits destruction of life and property by an occupant when it is "necessary to protect
the safety of his forces and to facilitate the success of his operation." LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
supra note 123, at 5-5 n.5. However, the principle of military necessity
does not permit the killing of innocent inhabitants for purposes of revenge or the satisfaction of a lust to kill. The destruction of property to be lawful must be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of
international law. There must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of
property and the overcoming of the enemy forces. It is lawful to destroy railways, lines of
communication, or any other property that might be utilized by the enemy. Private homes
and churches even may be destroyed if necessary for military operations. It does not admit
the wanton devastation of a district or the willful infliction of suffering upon its inhabitants
for the sake of suffering alone.
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alluded to in Protocol I, Article 54 which would permit a scorched-earth
policy by a state defending its territory
from invasion when the state has
1 4
such territory under its control. 1
Two salient questions, one of theory and one of practice, surface if
this argument is pursued in detail. First, for an argument based on a
scorched-earth (or spoiled-sea) policy to be acceptable, some credible expectation must exist for the belligerent to prove that such actions had a
reasonable chance for success. The unlawful occupation of Kuwait exposed the Iraqi military to attack and invasion from land, sea and air.
The overwhelming numbers and firepower of allied coalition forces
should have indicated to Iraq that any barrier to sea-borne invasion
would, at best, only hamper invasion efforts, with no real prospect of
thwarting an impending attack indefinitely.
Secondly, the Mina al Ahmadi pipeline and Sea Island Tanker Terminal lay ten miles off the Kuwaiti shore and about forty miles north of
the Saudi border.1 5 Perhaps the Iraqi government believed that through
its action it could turn the Persian Gulf into a sea of oil, or possibly even
a blazing inferno; that scenario, however must have appeared at best fanciful. A more reasonable expectation should have reckoned that the resultant oil slick might have covered only one-third of the approximately
120 miles of open shoreline available for an amphibious invasion. As a
consequence, the spill could only deny an invasion force one-third of its
potentially available amphibious landing sites. Further, it would obviously have no deterrent effect on the prospect of invasion by land or air.
To attach military purpose to the oil spill appears to be less than of
"imperative" necessity and would therefore fail to fulfill the requirements
for permissible environmental destruction set out in Protocol 1.156 Iraq
remained legally constrained by principles in the law of armed conflict
Id.
154 Regarding the protection of objects that are "indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population" of a belligerent state, Article 54 of Protocol I provides that:
1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production
of food-stuffs, crops, live stock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation
works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian
population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out
civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.

5. In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to the conflict in the defence of its
national territory against invasion, derogationfrom the prohibitionscontainedin paragraph
2 may be made by a Party to the conflict within such territory under its own control where
required by imperative military necessity.
Protocol I, supra note 117, art. 54 (emphasis added).
155 See Apple, supra note 6, at A6.
156 Protocol I, supra note 117, art. 54.
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which assert that the right of
the defender to adopt means of repulsing an
157
attacker is not unbounded.
That Iraq failed to honor those principles is an important comment
on the lackluster character of that government as a law-abiding member
of the international community. 158
As noted earlier, destruction of the environment as a premeditated
policy during war is not new. Frequently associated with scorched-earth
campaigns, General William T. Sherman once remarked in 1863 that
"the only possible way to end this unhappy and dreadful conflict [the
American Civil War] ... is to make it terrible beyond endurance."159
This concept of massive coercive warfare utilizes terror to subjugate the
enemy.
Certain legal problems arise in assessing the terror tactic as an explanation for Iraq's action. First, the term "environmental terrorism"
may be catchy, but it simply is not useful in international law. No consensus has developed on a definition of terrorism, either within the
United Nations, among the policy analysts, or by international legal
scholars. 6" Resort to the term "terrorism" merely muddles the relevant
issues and confuses international opinion over the legal questions motivating a violent act. 161
Use of terror tactics against civilians in warfare is generally condemned. 62 The issue was discussed during the drafting of Protocol I in
the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. 163 Indeed, Article 51 of the adopted Protocol I asserts that "the civilian
population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be made the
object of attack. Acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of
157 SIPRI, THE LAW OF WAR AND DUBIOUS WEAPONS 1 (1976).

158 The tendency by the Iraqi government during late 1991 to resort to unlawful activities is
clearly reflected in the 16 various resolutions adopted unanimously or near-unanimously by the U.N.
Security Council condemning Iraq for its various actions. Not only did Iraq aggressively invade
Kuwait, it also violated norms of international law against hostage-taking by its seizure of foreigners
as "human shields," committed acts of violence against diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait, attempted to alter the demographic composition of Kuwait, and committed numerous and
substantial violations of human rights against local Kuwaitis. See Joyner, supra note 5, at 8-12. For
fuller discussion of Iraqi violations see Christopher C. Joyner, The Persian Gulf War and International Law: Reasons or Excuses?, WORLD OUTLOOK: J. WORLD AFF. 130 (1992).
159 Henry Hitchcock, MARCHING WITH SHERMAN: LETrERS AND DIARIES OF HENRY
HITCHCOCK 35 (M.A. DeWolfe Howe ed., 1927).
160 Compare John F. Murphy, Defining InternationalTerrorism:A Way Out of the Quagmire,
19 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTs. 13 (1989) with Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Definition of Terrorism, 19
ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 39 (1989).

161 See Geoffrey Levitt, Is "Terrorism" Worth Defining?, 13 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 97 (1986).
162 SIPRI, supra note 157, at 24.
163 See Torsten Stein, How Much Humanity Do TerroristsDeserve?, in HUMANITARIAN LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT supra note 120, at 567, 573-574.
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which is to spread terror among the civilian population, are prohibited." 1 Use of terror violence against a civilian population is thus forbidden during international conflict.
In addition to semantic and legal problems of identifying the oil spill
as a terror tactic, a philosophical case against "eco-terrorism" may be
posited as well. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institutute
(SIPRI) expressed the point aptly when it observed, "Capitulation cannot be achieved by terror if there is still military hope left. If there is no
hope left, terror is unnecessary." 16 SIPRI's analysis is deductively instructive: "In view of this, the conclusion can be drawn that military
necessity in the form of coercive warfare is no argument for the thesis
that the rule forbidding attack on civilian populations as such should no
longer be considered valid." '66 In principle, use of terror as a policy instrument by states is rejected as unlawful by the international community
in times of war.1 6 This trend hopefully will continue through the codification of crimes of terror in times of peace, including destruction of the
environment to instill political fear in a population.
A third school of thought postulated that Iraq's polluting action
lacked any strategic purpose per se; the oil spill was the act of a despot
probing the will of the enemy, or perhaps even that of the whole international community. Release of the oil slick might have reflected an 1at68
tempt by Iraq to disrupt or strain the bounds of international norms.
Expressed tersely, through its policy of intentional environmental degradation, Iraq acted as a mean-spirited international bully in the Persian
Gulf.
The contention that Iraq released a massive oil spill in the gulf out
of sheer vileness is especially disturbing when viewed in light of recent
international legal developments. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
introduced the notion of ocean space beyond the limits of national jurisdiction being legally considered as the "common heritage of mankind. 16 9 Within the context of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea, the high seas are to be used for the benefit of mankind and no claims
164 Protocol I, supra note 117, art. 51, para. 2.
165 SIPRI, supra note 157, at 24.
166 Id.
167 I .

168 While the actual reasons or motivations for release of the oil slick have yet to be, and may
never be revealed, actions by the Iraqi government and its army during its occupation of Kuwait
strongly suggest that sheer meanness and perfidity might be the real considerations for the cause.
See Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Calls Gulf OilSpill a 'Sick'Act by Hussein, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 26, 1991,
at A5. For additional testimony on the brutality of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, see AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, IRAQ/OCCUPIED KUwAIT: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS SINCE AUGUST 2,

1990, MDE 14/16/90 (Dec. 1990).
169 See Christopher C. Joyner, Legal Implicationsof the Concept of the Common Heritageof
Mankind, 35 INT'L & CoMp. L. Q. 190, 191 (1986).
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of sovereignty or appropriation are to be recognized. 7 ° Such a positivist
philosophy describes open ocean space as res communis, belonging to no
state in particular and to the world community in general.1 71 Unfortunately, this philosophy leaves the marine environment exposed and vulnerable to exploitation. As John Kindt has opined, "According to the
concept known as the 'tragedy of the commons,' property which is part
of Mankind's common heritage does not belong to anyone in particular,
and therefore, there is no individual incentive to preserve it."'1 72 Simply
put, since each state is sovereign, each government theoretically could
despoil the environment in any manner it deemed necessary. Iraq clearly
desired to seize the advantage of such a rationale.
As a sovereign state, however, Iraq still remains subject to certain
limits and rules of international law. The oil slick originated some ten
miles off the coast of occupied Kuwait-fully within the territorial sea
delimitations claimed by both Kuwait and Iraq.17 Moreover, the issue
of state responsibility must be weighed in the balance. It should be realized that an international crime may result from seriously abrogating an
obligation of environmental protection law, particularly by the intentional discharge of massive pollution into high seas regions.174 Such international community environmental norms were articulated as early as
1938 in the Trail Smelter Case. 175 Though Iraq is a sovereign state, it
nonetheless is bound to abide by international law, if for no other reason
1 76

than to safeguard its own long-term interests in international affairs.

The failure by the Iraqi government to fulfill its international obligations
170 1982 LOS CONVENTION, supra note 75, art. 89. As provided in part by Article 87, "The
high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked." Id. art. 87. Article 88 provides in
full that "[t]he high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes." Id. art. 88.
171 See Bradley Larschan & Bonnie C. Brennan, The Common HeritageofMankind: Principle
in InternationalLaw, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305 (1983). See also EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN
FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQurrY 232-247 (1989).
172 2 JOHN WARREN KINDT, MARINE POLLUTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 1105 (1986).

173 Both Kuwait and Iraq claim a twelve mile territorial sea, as also does Saudi Arabia. See J.
FENWICK & D.A. Ross, INTERNATIONAL PROFILES ON MARINE SCIENCE RESEARCH JURISDICTION AND BOUNDARIES: NATURAL MARITIME CLAIMS, MSR JURISDICTION, & U.S. RESEARCH
CLEARANCE HISTORIES FOR THE WORLD'S COASTAL COUNTRIES (1992).
174 As Oscar Schachter has rightly posited, "there is no doubt that in principle, a state that

violates a rule of international law by an activity involving transborder injury is liable to make
reparation and to compensate the injured state." Schachter, supra note 1, at 482. See also Gaines,
supra note 36.
175 Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905. The tribunal decision against Canada
for its transfrontier air pollution concluded that "no State has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury.., to the territory of another or the properties or
persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence." Id. at 1965.
176 Gerhard von Glahn cites the following among the reasons why states obey international
law: "enlightened self-interest"; "necessity"; "credibility"; "habit"; "world opinion"; "social ap-
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under both the law of environmental protection and the law of armed
conflict could lead to various unilateral, regional and international actions designed to discourage similar acts in the future.1 7
Although excessive exploitation of the common heritage of mankind
might one day drift towards the "tragedy of the commons" on the high
seas, Iraq's deliberate discharge of oil occurred well within the territory
under its unlawful occupation. 17 1 While comprehensive, precisely defined norms for the protection of the global environment may not currently be codified, international legal opinion remains heavily weighed
against deliberate acts of environmental destruction, especially those
which have potentially far-reaching destructive impacts on neighboring
states.1 79 That this act of degradation occurred as part of a larger unlawful act of aggression highlights its impermissible character.
Although enthusiasm for establishing an international tribunal to
try Iraqi officials for war crimes-including acts which destroyed
Kuwaiti national property-appears to be waning, i 180 important precedents for such trials do exist. Both the Nuremberg and Tokyo war
crimes trials after World War II focused on system criminality; that is,
the proceedings were not concerned with violations of the laws of combat. Rather, the trials tended to focus more on official violations of the
laws of occupation, especially gross violations of the rights of civilian
populations.""8
Were a case to be marshalled against the Iraqi leadership in the Gulf
1 82
War, concentration should fall on violations of belligerent occupation.
proval and costs"; and "disadvantages of expediency." VON GLAHN, supra note 104, at 6-7. With
respect to legal obligation, Brierly observed:
The ultimate explanation of the binding force of all law is that man, whether he is a single
individual or whether he is associated with other men in a state, is constrained, in so far as
he is a reasonable human being, to believe that order and not chaos is the governing principle of the world in which he has to live.
BRIERLY, supra note 101, at 56.
177 That is, such violations of these eco-conflict legal obligations could result in international
punitive sanctions to serve as deterrence for other would-be miscreants in the international

community.
178 The Sea Island Tanker Terminal was located ten miles offshore Kuwait. See Apple, supra
note 6 and accompanying text. Additionally, Kuwait claims a twelve mile territorial sea. See FENWICK & Ross, supra note 173.
179 See generally SIPRI, ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE, supra note 2; SIPRI, WARFARE IN A
FRAGILE WORLD, supra note 151.
180 Although a U.N. Security Council Resolution would hold Iraq responsible for violations of
international law, no international tribunal has yet been established to try the war crimes nor has the
United States demonstrated enthusiasm for forcibly apprehending Saddam Hussein in order to try
him for the alleged crimes. See Hoffman, supra note 149.
181 See generally William V. O'Brien, The Nuremberg Precedent and the Gulf War, 31 VA. J.
INT'L L. 391 (1991); John Norton Moore, War Crimes and the Rule of Law in the Gulf Crisis, 31
VA. J.INT'L L. 403 (1991).
182 See Jordan J.Paust, Suing Saddam: PrivateRemedies for War Crimes and Hostage-Taking,
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Such laws are well developed, internationally codified, and draw heavily
from the customary practice of states.183 Indeed, rules affecting belligerent occupation are codified in Section III of the Hague Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and are entitled "On
Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile State." 184 In setting
out its mandate, the Nuremberg court in fact determined that the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 had already become customary law and
were therefore binding on all states. 8 Just as the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes trials and the 1949 Geneva Conventions advanced the
laws of war towards a more humanitarian ideal, Protocol I also makes a
contribution in damage limitation. Should Protocol I be invoked in the
absence of a "military necessity defense," that instrument would hold a
commander criminally liable when actions ordered by the commander
cause extensive damage.1 86 Damage, of course, is not merely consigned
to obliteration of a military target. Excessive damage also pertains to
collateral damage of civilian areas and to destruction of the physical environment.18 7 Military doctrine has purposefully
attempted to limit in
188
law and policy such extraordinary destruction.
International law has substantially broadened its humanitarian emphasis during the past century to encompass environmental protection
during war.18 9 Interestingly enough, the Nuremberg Trials actually supplied a significant source of customary law against devastation of the environment. Several defendants were tried for what amounted to the
massive devastation of the environment.1 90 Though acquitted, the willingness of the tribunal to subject the accused to trial, and the finding by
the tribunal that "devastation prohibited by the Hague Rules and the
usages of war is not warranted by military necessity" 19 1 affirmed that the
31 VA. J. INT'L L. 351 (1991); Louis Rene Beres, The United StatesShould Take the Lead in Preparing InternationalLegal Machineryfor Prosecution of Iraqi Crimes, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 381 (1991).
183 See generally GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY:

A

COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION (1957).

184 Annex to the Convention, Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, 1 Bevans 631; ERNST H. FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 5 (1942).

185 O'Brien, supra note 81, at 395.
186 LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 123, at 6-5.

187 Id. at 8-5.
188

Id.

189 See generally W. PAUL GORMLEY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION (1976).

190 The German policy of environmental destruction during the retreat from Norway, the Soviet Union and the Balkans fell under the jurisdiction of the trials. See AUGUST VON KNIERIEM,
THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 398-400 (1959).

191 Id. at 399.
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premeditated destruction of the environment during war is not tolerated
under the customary law of armed conflict.
In 1977, a special international agreement was negotiated that outlawed ecological warfare. Developed within the United Nations, the
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Technique (ENMOD) 192 asserts that parties
undertake "not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe
effects as3 a means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State
party.

19

The ENMOD Convention deals with environmental changes produced by deliberate manipulation of natural processes. Though the ban
under the ENMOD Convention applies to the conduct of military operations during armed conflict, its prohibitions are intended to be distinct
from conventional warfare that might result in adverse impacts on the
environment. In short, this agreement prohibits manipulation of natural
processes (including the biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere, or atmosphere
of the latter) as an instrument of war if their effects are "widespread,
long-lasting or severe."' 194 While still important, it remains regrettable
that this agreement specifies the level of damage to be prohibited. Outright proscription of any environmental modification for hostile purposes
would have supplied a stronger injunction against environmental

warfare.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

A real nexus exists between the law of environmental protection and
the law of armed conflict that has evolved over several decades. The
192 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 16 I.L.M. 90 [hereinafter ENMOD
Convention].
193 Id. art. 1.
194 Id. Perhaps most relevant for this study, Articles 1, 2 and 4 of the ENMOD Convention
stipulate the obligatory mandate not to use environmental modification techniques in warfare:
Art. 1: Each state party to this convention undertakes not to engage in military or
any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, longlasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other state.
Art. 2: As used in article 1, the term "environmental modification techniques" refers
to any technique for changing-through the deliberate manipulation of natural processesthe dynamics, composition or structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere or of outer space.
Art. 4: Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to take any measure it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional process to prohibit and prevent any
activity in violation of the provisions of the convention anywhere under its jurisdiction or
control.
Id. arts. 1, 2 &4.
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general, over-arching principle of conservation remains the primary link
in the development in these two important bodies of contemporary international law.
The law of environmental protection is a comparably newer body of
law that only recently has emerged from under the shadow of broader
humanitarian law. Its relative novelty admittedly poses certain difficulties for international law. In fact, requirements of state responsibility for
environmental protection and preservation, as well as attendant questions of liability and compensation for environmental injury currently
remain in relative flux and legal limbo. Even so, as these environmental
protection laws mature outside the war-time scenario, environmental priorities must be given additional consideration by government decisionmakers and military planners. This prerequisite has become firmly fixed
in both the laws of environmental protection and armed conflict. And
the urgency for this development in international law was boldly underscored by the Iraqi oil spill.
Although both the law of environmental protection and that of regulation of the conduct of war share humanitarian, environmental and
conservation objectives and ideals, the law of armed conflict appears
bound to assume greater relevance in situations like the 1991 Gulf War
oil spill. That conclusion mirrors more the acceptability of environmental considerations in the laws of war than the acceptability of war in
environmental protection law. Yet, perhaps closer union of the two bodies of law might strengthen the deterrent value of international law such
that tempted purveyors of environmental harm will change tactics and
resort to less destructive measures.
The notion of "ecocide" perpetrated as a crime against the environment may well become more fully recognized and legally relevant as a
result of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Governments will be more reluctant to resort to wholesale policies of wanton environmental waste and
destruction, or to view such strategies as cost-effective, necessary tools of
war. Still, establishing "ecocide" as a specific crime under international
law would serve twin purposes, namely, to deter future environmental
abuse and to strengthen the moral foundations of ecological conservation
and protection. Making environmental destruction an international
crime would firmly fix Leopold's "land ethic" as a relevant construct
within the laws of war. Importantly, then, consideration of environmental preservation will have emerged as an integral component of the established tradition of the laws of armed conflict. No less important, this
would also reaffirm the vital place held by the law of environmental protection during times of peace.

